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 Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of the implementation of a monetary union on the international 
transmission of monetary and fiscal policies. A dynamic three-country general equilibrium 
model, exhibiting monopolistic competition and sticky prices, is used to show how asymmetric 
monetary and fiscal policy shocks affect the production and consumption decisions in the 
three countries. The international effects of asymmetric monetary and fiscal policy shocks are 
then compared with respect to the two situations – before and after the implementation of a 
(two-country) monetary union. It is shown that all key economic variables of the two countries 
forming a monetary union react completely symmetrically to no longer independent monetary 
and fiscal policy shocks. Even the fiscal policies of the countries forming a monetary union 
themselves turn out to become symmetric, although, in principle, there is no particular need for 
government spending levels to be fully synchronized within a monetary union. 
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 1
The participants of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which has become effective at the 
beginning of 1999, have committed themselves to replace their national currencies by a common 
currency, the Euro. This includes giving up their national monetary policy autonomy in favor of a 
common monetary policy implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB). Concerning fiscal 
policy, EMU contains a set of fiscal stringency criteria that were designed to enhance the 
discipline of national fiscal authorities and to avoid countries running unsustainable budget deficits. 
The implications of EMU can be distinguished into internal and external implications, with internal 
implications comprising all effects of EMU on the interactions between the participating countries 
and the external implications comprising all effects on the interactions of the EU economy with the 
rest of the world1. 
 
International transmission issues of macroeconomic policies have mostly been analyzed in the 
framework of the classical textbook Mundell-Fleming model. While appealing for their empirical 
plausibility, the lack of microfoundations in the "Keynesian" models presents problems in many 
respects, e.g. they ignore the intertemporal budget constraints and do not clearly describe how 
macroeconomic policies influence production decisions. Only recently intertemporal optimizing 
models, additionally incorporating market imperfections, have emerged in the field of open-
economy macroeconomic policy analysis. For a survey of static and dynamic open-economy 
models based on imperfect competition see Dixon (1993). It is, however, common to both types 
of models, to recent intertemporal models as well as to traditional Keynesian-style models2, that 
asymmetric macroeconomic policy shocks are identified to be especially important in open-
economy macroeconomic analysis. For it is this type of shocks that leads to internationally 
asymmetric dynamics of output, consumption and the current account. Thus, also the analysis in 
this paper is focused on the international effects of asymmetric rather than symmetric monetary 
and fiscal policy shocks. 
 
The implementation of a monetary union – especially the EMU –, however, imposes considerable 
constraints on the nature and feasibility of asymmetric macroeconomic policies: There is 
absolutely no scope for asymmetric monetary policy anymore, once the common monetary 
authority (ECB) has centralized the monetary policy of the whole monetary union. Fiscal policy, 
on the other hand, need, in principle, not be synchronized as a consequence of the monetary 
union, since the responsibility for fiscal issues remains in the hands of national authorities. In the 
concrete case of EMU, however, a set of fiscal stringency criteria has been specified ("stability 
pact"), which substantially restricts the scope of asymmetric fiscal policies within the monetary 
union. Hence, these constraints on asymmetric policies have to be taken into account when 
analyzing the implications of establishing a monetary union on the international transmission of 
macroeconomic policies. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze if and how the implementation of EMU affects the international 
transmission of monetary and fiscal policies. To do so, a non-stochastic three-country general 
                                                 
1 For further discussions of internal and external implications of EMU, see Van Aarle, Garretsen and van 
Moorsel (1998). 
2 For the case of the Mundell-Fleming model, see Dornbusch (1980, Chapter 11). 
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equilibrium model is developed where we assume that the world economy consists of three 
different countries which we label Germany for country 1, France for country 2 and the United 
States for country 3. According to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), who first introduced a two-
country version of this model3, the model is intended to combine the modern intertemporal 
approach to the current account and fiscal policy with the "Keynesian" assumption of short-run 
output price rigidities4. Furthermore, the supply sector of the model features imperfect 
competition (in the form of monopolistic competition) which in combination with short-run price 
stickiness creates a transmission mechanism from monetary policy to the real side of the 
economy. In particular, combining the assumptions of sticky prices and monopolistic competition 
implies that output becomes demand-determined in the short run, thereby allowing monetary and 
fiscal policy shocks to affect endogenous output. Above all, it is very interesting to note that the 
real effects of the policy shocks last substantially longer than the nominal rigidities are assumed to 
be effective, which is due to the induced international transfer of wealth via the current account. 
 
The three-country structure of the model enables us to compare the international transmission of 
monetary and fiscal policy shocks before and after the implementation of EMU. For this purpose, 
the international transmission along with the channels of transmission of the policy shocks as well 
as the macroeconomic adjustment following these shocks are analyzed under two different 
regimes: First, when the three countries are completely independent with respect to their monetary 
and fiscal policies, and, second, when two of the three countries decide to form a monetary union. 
The three-country structure of the model, furthermore, implies that the internal and external 
implications of EMU, which have so far been considered separately in the literature, can be 
analyzed jointly in this study. The internal implications have already been discussed extensively in 
the framework of the Optimum Currency Area theory, which is concerned with evaluating the 
costs and benefits of tighter monetary integration. The analysis of the external implications, which 
compared to the internal implications seem to be less present in the current discussion about 
EMU, is concerned, above all, with the determination of the external value of the Euro and its 
potential future role in foreign exchange and capital markets. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section I develops a three-country general equilibrium model 
with monopolistic competition that serves as our main workhorse. In section II the short-run 
dynamics of the model under the assumption of preset output prices are explored. This includes 
solving for the short-run variables as functions of the monetary and fiscal shocks. In section III we 
discuss how the international transmission of monetary and fiscal policies is affected by the 
implementation of a monetary union and compare those transmissions and their implications in the 
two situations, before and after the monetary union is established. Section IV, finally, concludes 
our analysis. 
                                                 
3 Their model was the first attempt to analyze international transmission of macroeconomic policies in a 
rigorous and coherent way by incorporating explicit microfoundations of aggregate supply. 
4 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) show that the central results of the model are equivalent, regardless of whether it 
is output prices or nominal wages that are assumed to be sticky in the short run. 
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I.  A Three-Country General Equilibrium Model with Monopolistic 
Competition 
This section develops a perfect-foresight three-country general equilibrium monetary model with 
monopolistic competition5. First, an equilibrium is derived for the case of flexible output prices 
before the equilibrium relations are reconsidered with the assumption of one-period 
predetermined output prices being imposed. 
I.A. Preferences, Technology and Market Structure  
Let the world be inhabited by a continuum of infinitely-lived producer-consumers ("yeoman 
farmers"), indexed by z Î [0,1], each of whom specializes in the production of a single 
differentiated good, also indexed by z. Thus, each producer is a monopoly supplier of the good 
he produces in a way that he has the power to set the price of his product, following Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki (1987)6. Country 1 consists of producers on the interval [0,n1], country 2 on (n1, 
n2] and the remaining producers (n2,1] reside in country 3. Although the model is rather stylized 
(no capital/investment, no asset markets except private bonds), it is not an endowment economy 
because labor supply is perfectly elastic. 
 
All individuals in all countries are assumed to have identical preferences, dependent upon a real 
consumption index, real money balances and the work effort. Since all individuals have symmetric 
preferences and constraints, the maximization problem can be analyzed for a representative 
consumer. As far as notation is concerned, we have to note that all the expressions and variables 
which will be introduced below, are, in fact, threefold, referring to the three different countries. 
This implies that each variable has to be indexed with reference to the country it belongs, e.g. 
Ct1, Ct2 and Ct3 denote private consumption at time t of the representative individual residing in 
country 1, 2 and 3, respectively. To save space, we will, however, drop these indices in most 
cases and develop the model for a representative country, which we call ”home”, and use the 
indices only where absolutely necessary. The latter is the case, for instance, when we define one 
of the three exchange rates by making use of the law of one price. 
 
                                                 
5 The model is mainly based on Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 10). In 
deriving the supply side of the model we follow along the lines of Ball and Romer (1989) and Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987). The closest precursor to this model is probably Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989), who 
explore international transmissions of monetary disturbances in a two-country setting with monopolistic 
competition and sticky prices. 
6 The main difference between this model and the static closed-economy model in Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987) is, that in the latter, both, output and labor markets are assumed to be monopolistically competitive. In 
order to focus more clearly on the equilibrium relations that are of interest here and to simplify the exposition, 
this paper does not explicitly model firms and the labor market. There is no problem in doing so, because the 
assumption of many monopolistically supplying producer-consumers allows us to derive the pricing/supply 
decision without having explicitly to introduce firms and factor markets. 
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Let the intertemporal utility function of a representative home agent be given by7 
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where u and v are increasing concave functions, w is an increasing convex function and 0 < b  < 1 
is a discount factor. The real consumption index, C, is given by a constant-elasticity-of 
substitution (CES) subutility specification 
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where c(z) denotes the representative home individual's consumption of good z and q > 1 
representing the (constant) elasticity of substitution between various goods8. The price deflator for 
nominal money balances is the consumption-based money price index of the home country which 
is given by 
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        (3) 
where p(z) is the home-currency price of product z9. Thus, the home price index takes into 
account also home-currency prices of foreign goods and vice versa, since the bounds of 
integration are [0,1] and not only [0,n1] or [n1, n2] or [n2,1]. The same applies to the private 
consumption index, C. The w function in the period utility function (1) captures the disutility of 
work, which is positively related to output. 
 
It is assumed that there are no impediments to trade, so that the law of one price holds for each 
individual good across all countries. Let E12 be the nominal exchange rate of country 1 vis-à-vis 
country 2, defined as the price of country 2 currency measured in units of the currency of country 
110, p1(z) and p2(z) the price of good z in country 1 and country 2 currency, respectively. The 
law of one price then implies that 
( ) ( )p z E p z1 12 2= .        (4) 
                                                 
7 Here a money-in-the-utility approach is chosen in order to introduce currency. It can be shown, though, that 
a model embedding a cash-in-advance constraint for consumers and the government would yield qualitatively 
similar results (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, Chapter 8). Also Feenstra (1986) discusses the equivalence of 
money-in-the-utility-function and cash-in-advance constraint approaches to money demand. Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987) argue that in money-in-the-utility models money can be interpreted to play the role of a non-
produced good and as such provides liquidity services. 
8 By assuming constant elasticity of substitution specifications in utility and consumption, we followed the 
lines of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). These specifications eventually lead to a constant price elasticity of demand 
(which will turn out to be equal to q as can be seen from (13)) and a constant markup of price over marginal 
cost. As marginal revenue becomes negative when the elasticity of demand is less than 1, q has to be greater 
than 1 in order to ensure a well behaved equilibrium solution with positive output. 
9 The consumption-based price index is defined as the minimum expenditure of money required to purchase 
one unit of C, which is equivalent to purchasing goods that yield a consumption index of C by a minimum 
expenditure of PC. This minimization problem is explicitly solved in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 4). 
10 Thus a rise (fall) in E12 implies a depreciation (appreciation) of the country 1 currency versus the currency 
of country 2. 
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Since the preferences of all countries' residents are identical, the law of one price, also called 
purchasing power parity (PPP), holds also for consumption-based price indices, such that11 
P E P1 12 2= .         (6) 
Of course, due to the law of one price, the analogous relations ( ) ( )p z E p z1 13 3=  and 
( ) ( )p z E p z2 23 3=  have to be equally true which implies that also 
P E P1 13 3=   and       (6) 
P E P2 23 3= .         (7) 
It is assumed that the only internationally traded asset is a riskless real bond denominated in terms 
of the composite consumption good. Assuming this, each representative home individual faces the 
following period budget constraint (written in nominal terms)12: 
( ) ( ) ( )P B M P r B M p z y z P C Pt t t t t t t t t t t t t+ -+ = + + + - -1 11 t   (8) 
where rt denotes the real rate of interest earned on bonds between t-1 and t, Mt and Bt+1 are the 
demands for nominal money balances and real bonds in period t, yt(z) is the output produced by 
agent z at time t and sold at the price pt(z) of good z, and tt denotes real lump-sum taxes13. Due 
to the assumption that home as well as foreign residents derive utility exclusively from their 
respective domestic currency, there is no currency substitution in this model and individuals only 
demand the respective domestic currency. 
 
By integrating forward the period budget constraint (8) one can derive the intertemporal or 
lifetime budget constraint14 from which we can obtain the transversality condition 
                                                 
11 This can easily be seen from an extension of a country 1 and 2 version of equation (3)  
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. From this we can also see that the exchange rate 
of country 1 versus country 3 becomes redundant, as it can be defined in terms of the other two exchange 
rates: E E E13 12 23= . We will make use of this relation where appropriate. While PPP holds for the 
consumption-based price index, it does not for national output deflators since relative prices of various goods 
need not remain constant in all countries. Indeed, changes in the terms  of trade – the relative price of home 
and foreign goods – will play a major role in this model. 
12 The PtCt term in (8) would be ( ) ( )p z c z dzt t
0
1
ò  before symmetry of agents is imposed. In principle p(z) need 
not be the same for all z due to price discrimination between goods, but in equilibrium symmetric producers 
will find it optimal to choose the same price for their differentiated goods. 
13 Introducing income taxes would add another distortion to the model from which we want to abstract in 
order to focus on effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks only. 
14 Following this we get the lifetime budget constraint 
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The transversality condition is imposed to rule out unbounded borrowing and is required in order 
to fully characterize the equilibrium, together with the first-order conditions (16)-(18) and the 
period budget constraint (8). In a finite-lives framework this condition could be interpreted as 
follows: Optimality implies that individuals, who cannot pass on debt when they leave the world, 
have to have consumed all their wealth, composed of bonds and real money holdings, at the end 
of their lives. 
 
Since Ricardian equivalence holds in this model15, we can, without loss of generality, simply 
assume that the government runs a balanced budget each period. Hence, the government budget 
constraint specifies that government purchases are totally financed by taxes and seignorage 
revenues, i.e. 
G
M M
Pt t
t t
t
= +
- -t 1 .       (10) 
where ( )G g z dz=
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ú
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ò
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q
q
q1
0
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       (11) 
and g(z) denotes the home government’s consumption of good z. 
 
In order to derive the representative home individual's consumption demand for good z, c(z), the 
monopolistically competitive equilibrium in the output market has to be found. An optimizing agent 
will allocate his consumption spending across alternative differentiated goods so as to maximize 
the CES consumption index C (2) subject to any fixed value of total nominal expenditures Z, 
where ( ) ( )Z p z c z dz= ò
0
1
. Following this procedure, a home individual's demand for z at date t is 
given by16 
( )
( )
c z
p z
P
Ct
t
t
t=
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÷
-q
        (12) 
                                                                                                                                                    
defined as ( )
1
1
1
+
= +Õ rvv t
s , and it+1 the nominal interest rate for home-currency loans between t and t+1 
defined as ( )1 11 1 1+ = ++ + +i PP rt
t
t
t . 
15 By combining the lifetime budget constraint (in footnote 14) and an intertemporal version of the 
government budget constraint (equation (10)) we get an expression for the overall lifetime resource constraint 
of the home economy ( ) ( )R C r B R p y
P
Gt s s t t t s
s s
s
s
s ts t
, ,= + + -
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
=
¥
=
¥
åå 1 . From this we can see that Ricardian 
equivalence holds because taxes do not enter the previous equation implying that the time path of taxes does 
not affect consumption choices and output. 
16 This is also the classical monopolistically competitive equilibrium result obtained by Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977). 
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where it turns out that q, being the elasticity of substitution in (2), now represents also the 
elasticity of demand with respect to relative price. Foreign residents have analogous demand 
functions. If we assume that also the government allocates its expenditures so as to minimize the 
cost of production, an equation equivalent to (12) also applies to the government demand for 
good z. The world demand for a particular good z can be derived now by integrating the sum of 
private consumption demand and government demand for this good over all individuals and 
making use of (4), (5), (6) and (7) which imply that p1(z)/P1 = p2(z)/P2 = p3(z)/P3 for any good 
z, thus 
( ) ( ) ( )y z p z
P
C Gt
d t
t
t
W
t
W=
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ +
-q
      
 (13) 
where 
( ) ( )C n C n n C n CW = + - + -1 2 1 21 2 1 3 ,     (14) 
( ) ( )G n G n n G n GW = + - + -1 2 1 21 2 1 3      (15) 
 
are the world demands for private consumption and government spending respectively, given by a 
population weighted average of demands in country 1, 2 and 3 (if agents are symmetric within 
each country). 
I.B. Individual Maximization 
It is assumed that each agent takes the aggregate price index, Pt , as well as the world output 
demand, CtW+GtW, as given when making his own pricing and spending decisions, since 
individual decisions represent only a neglegible contribution to the aggregate indices. In order to 
eliminate pt(z) from the period budget constraint (8)17 we make use of the above demand 
equation (13), implying ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p z y z P y z C Gt t t t tW tW= +
-q
q q
1 1
, and use the resulting expression to 
substitute for Ct in the u function. Thus we get an unconstraint maximization problem and can find 
the first-order conditions with respect to Bt+1 , Mt , and yt(z): 
( ) ( ) ( )¢ = + ¢+ +u C r u Ct t tb 1 1 1 ,       (16) 
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Wq
q
q q
1 1 1
    (18) 
where the nominal interest rate it+1 is as in footnote 14. Equation (16) is the standard first-order 
consumption Euler equation. The money market equilibrium condition (17) equates the marginal 
utility of consuming a unit of consumption good to the opportunity cost of holding real balances 
measured in consumption units. Notice that money demand here depends on consumption rather 
than income. The labor-leisure trade-off condition (18) states that the marginal utility cost of 
                                                 
17 In Woodford (1996) the pricing decision of the monopolistic supplier is modeled explicitly. 
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producing an extra unit of output equals the marginal utility from consuming the revenue of the 
extra unit of output (marginal cost = marginal revenue). 
In order to get simpler expressions, let us introduce now the specific functional forms of the u, v, 
w functions in the individual’s utility function. Let u(Ct) be given by log(Ct) implying an elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution of unity, let v(Mt/Pt) be clog(Mt/Pt) where c is a factor determining 
the importance of real balances in the utility function, and let w(yt(z)) be quadratic of the form 
( )k
2
2y zt  with an elasticity of disutility from output being equal to two18. According to the 
functional form of the w function, a fall in k would imply a rise in productivity. Plugging these 
expressions into the first-order conditions (16)–(18), we can find the corresponding specific first-
order conditions: 
( )C r Ct t t+ += +1 11b ,        (16A) 
M
P
i
i
Ct
t
t
t
t=
+ +
+
c
1 1
1
,        (17A) 
( )y
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ø÷ +
1 11 1
.      (18A) 
 
I.C. Global Equilibrium and A Symmetric Steady State (with flexible prices) 
 
A global equilibrium in this model implies that all markets of the global economy, i.e. the money 
market, the asset market and the goods market, have to be in equilibrium. Thus, the market-
clearing conditions for the three markets are as follows: Aggregate money demand must equal 
money supply in each country, since individuals wish to hold only domestic currency. World net 
foreign asset holdings must be zero, hence 
( ) ( )n B n n B n Bt t t1 2 1 21 2 1 3 0+ - + - = , "t.    (19) 
The output-market-clearing condition can be derived by making use of the individual country 
versions of the representative individual's period budget constraint (8) and the government budget 
constraint (10) and finally imposing condition (19) to obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C G n p y
P
n n
p y
P
n
p y
P
Yt
W
t
W t t
t
t t
t
t t
t
t
W+ = + - + - º1 2 1 2
1 1
1
2 2
2
1
3 3
3
(20) 
where y(1) and p(1) denote output and price – measured in the respective domestic currency – of 
a representative country 1 good19. Analogously, y(2), y(3) and p(2), p(3) are the output levels 
and prices of the representative goods produced in countries 2 and 3, respectively. Equation (20) 
                                                 
18 These functional forms of the u, v, w subutility functions do also ensure that the required sufficiency 
condition for the existence of equilibrium is fulfilled. This can be verified by computing the Hessian of the 
individual’s utility function which has to be negative semi-definite for the solution to be a maximum. 
19 It is the assumption of completely symmetric producers within each country which implies that in 
equilibrium they set the same price and produce the same quantity of their good. Therefore, each good may be 
called a "representative good". 
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states that in equilibrium global "total" (i.e. private and government) real consumption equals 
global real income. 
 
Due to monopoly pricing and endogenous output this model does not yield simple closed-form 
solutions for general paths of the exogenous variables20. Examining a linearized version of the 
above equilibrium relations does yield simple closed-form solutions and is also sufficient for the 
purpose of our analysis. In order to compute the linearizations, we first have to find a well-defined 
flexible-price steady state around which to approximate. We therefore look for a steady state in 
which all exogenous variables are constant. In this case the steady state world real interest rate, 
r , is determined by the Euler equation (16A): 
r =
-1 b
b
         (21) 
where overbars here and in the following always indicate steady state values. After imposing 
constant bond holdings and constant money supply in the steady state, one can find – by making 
use of (8) – that steady state real per capita consumption is equal to real interest earnings from 
bonds plus steady state real income less real per capita government spending: 
C rB
py
P
G= + - .        (22) 
A simple closed-form solution does exist for the case of symmetric initial conditions with respect 
to the distribution of wealth, specifically, net foreign assets are assumed to be zero in all countries 
in the initial steady state, implying that B B B0 0 01 2 3 0= = = . In this special case the relation 
( ) ( ) ( )p P p P p P0 0 0 0 0 01 1 2 2 3 3 1/ /= = =  holds and the equilibrium turns out to be completely 
symmetric across the three countries. From this and from the demand equation (13) it follows that 
y y y C G C G C G C GW W0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 3= = = + = + = + = + . (23) 
The labor-leisure condition (18A) and the money market equilibrium relation (17A) then imply 
that in equilibrium 
y y y0 0 0
1
2
1 2 3
1
= = =
-æ
èç
ö
ø÷
q
qk
 (if also G G G0 0 01 2 3 0= = = ) and (24) 
( )M
P
M
P
M
P
r
r
y0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
1
= = =
+
c .      (25) 
Equation (24) indicates that the producer's monopoly power pushes global output below the level 
that would obtain in a perfectly competitive equilibrium, which is indeed approached as the 
various goods become closer and closer substitutes (i.e. as q ® ¥)21. Since we are assuming a 
zero-inflation steady state, it is the real rather than the nominal interest rate on which the steady 
state level of real money balances is depending in equation (25). 
 
                                                 
20 The effects of macroeconomic policies could also be analyzed by numerical simulations, which is not the 
approach followed in this paper, but is done in Rumler (1999). 
21 The inefficiently low level of output in our decentralized economy is an important result of this model. In 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) it drives most of their welfare results. An analogous result is obtained also in the 
static closed-economy model of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987); cf. equation (5), p. 650. 
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I.D. The Log-Linearized System 
This section develops an approximate linear system by log-linearizing all of the model's equilibrium 
conditions around the initial symmetric steady state with B B B0 0 01 2 3 0= = =  and 
G G G0 0 01 2 3 0= = = . For this purpose all variables are expressed as percent deviations from 
their initial steady state, denoted by hats and defined as the logarithmic derivative: 
$ logX d X dX Xt t tº = 0  where X 0  represents the initial (pre-shock) steady state value22. The 
technique of log-linearizing is straightforward and requires only basic differential calculus. 
 
Again, in order to save space, the log-linearizations are displayed here only for one representative 
country called ”home”, which, in general, allows us to drop country indices. When exchange rates 
are involved – as in equations (26)–(31) – we cannot, however, drop the country indices, since 
we want to be able to distinguish between the different exchange rates. Thus, manipulating 
equations (3), (5), (6), (7), (13), (16A), (17A), (18A) and (20) in the way described above 
yields the following relations: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]$ $ $ $ $ $P n p n n E p n E pt t t t t t1 1 12 2 1 13 31 2 1 2= + - + + - + ,  (26) 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]$ $ $ $ $ $P n p E n n p n E pt t t t t t2 1 12 2 1 23 31 2 1 2= - + - + - + ,  (27) 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $P n p E n n p E n pt t t t t t3 1 13 2 23 1 31 2 1 2= - + - - + - ,  (28) 
$ $ $P E Pt t t1 12 2= + ,        (29) 
$ $ $P E Pt t t1 13 3= + ,        (30) 
$ $ $P E Pt t t2 23 3= + ,        (31) 
[ ]$ $ $ $ $y P p C Gt t t tW tW= - + +q ,       (32) 
where $Gt
W  is defined as dG Ct
W W
0  because G
W
0 0= ; the same, of course, applies to $Gt ; 
$ $ $C C
r
r
rt t t+ += + +1 11
,        (33) 
$ $ $
$ $ $
M P C
P P
r
r
rt t t
t t t- = -
-
-
+
+ +1 1
1
,      (34) 
( )q q+ = - + +1 $ $ $ $y C C Gt t tW tW ,      (35) 
( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $C G n y n n y n ytW tW t t t+ = + - + -1 2 1 21 2 1 3 .    (36) 
This last equation follows from the linearization of equation (20) and by imposing flexible prices or 
making use of (26), (27) and (28). With these linearizations in hand, we can now solve the model 
for a flexible price steady state (i.e. when $ $p Pt t= , "t), and then also for the dynamics due to 
short-run price rigidities. Before solving for the steady state, we still need to linearize equation 
(22) which is valid only in the steady-state so that time subscripts can be dropped: 
$ $ $ $ $ $C rB p P y G= + - + -        (37) 
                                                 
22 Technically speaking, the term dX Xt 0  is a continuous approximation of the discrete-time quotient 
( )X X Xt - 0 0 , which indeed defines a percent deviation from the initial value X 0 , or also a growth rate over 
the specified time horizon. 
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where ( )$X dX X X X X= = -0 0 0  denotes the percentage change in the variable's steady-
state value, and $B  is normalized by initial consumption since B0 0= . 
I.E. Solving for the Steady State 
To solve for the steady state we have to note that equations (26)–(36) hold at all points in time, 
thus also for steady-state changes. Together with equation (37) and the respective foreign analogs 
these yield a system of 22 simultaneous equations in 24 barred variables which can be solved 
quite easily by making use of the model's symmetry. This approach requires solving first for 
differences between per capita variables – which yields three equations for each variable due to 
the three possible combinations (X1-X2, X1-X3, X2-X3) – and then for population-weighted 
world aggregates23. Following this and making use of equations (29)–(31) and (32), (35), (37) 
together with their foreign analogs, the difference between steady-state (percent) consumption 
changes of country 1 and country 2 can be written as a function of the differences in net foreign 
asset and government spending changes: 
( ) ( )[ ]$ $ $ $ $ $C C r B B G G1 2 12 1 2 1 2- = + - - -qq .     (38) 
(Of course, two equivalent equations apply to the consumption differentials between country 1 
and 3 and between country 2 and 3 but are left out to save space, as will always be done from 
now on.) Similar manipulations lead to the steady-state change in the terms of trade of country 1 
vis-à-vis country 2 which is then given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]$ $ $ $ $ $ $p E p r B B G G1 12 2 12 1 2 1 2- - = - - -q .   
 (39) 
By aggregating equation (35) and combining it with (36) we get a relationship between steady-
state world consumption and steady-state world income: 
$ $y GW W=
1
2
,         (40) 
$ $C GW W= -
1
2
.        (41) 
A permanent rise in world government spending raises steady-state world output, since the 
individuals on the aggregate level respond by substituting into work and out of leisure. For the 
same reason, world consumption falls by less than the rise in world government spending (partial 
crowding-out). Given the solutions for differences and world aggregates, the changes in steady-
state values of individual variables can be found by making use of the identities 
( )( ) ( )( )$ $ $ $ $ $X X n n X X n X XW1 1 2 1 1 32 1 2= + - - + - -    and  
( ) ( )( )$ $ $ $ $ $X X n X X n X XW2 1 2 1 2 31 2= - - + - -       and  
( ) ( )( )$ $ $ $ $ $X X n X X n n X XW3 1 3 2 31 2 1= - - - - - . Combining (38) with the corresponding 
expression for $ $C C1 3-  and (41) in this way yields 
                                                 
23 This solution approach has been introduced by Aoki (1981). 
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$ $ $ $ $C rB
n
G
n n
G
n
G1
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
31 2 1 2=
+æ
èç
ö
ø÷ -
- +æ
èç
ö
ø÷ +
-æ
èç
ö
ø÷ +
-æ
èç
ö
ø÷
q
q
q
q q q
.  (42) 
Equations (38), (39) and (42) show that any country's per capita consumption and terms of trade 
rise or improve when it receives a transfer of wealth – in the form of increased net foreign asset 
holdings – and deteriorate or fall when the home government increases its spending relative to the 
foreign governments. The former is due to the permanently higher interest income received from 
increased asset holdings, while the latter stems from the fact that, according to the individual's 
budget constraint, higher government spending in the home country has to be borne fully by home 
residents, whereas the benefits – in the form of higher demand and output – fall on foreigners as 
well. In the home country, however, the positive output effect is more than offset by the increased 
tax burden, thereby inducing private consumption to fall, but to fall by less than the associated tax 
increase. 
 
Moreover, we can observe that – with flexible prices – real steady-state world aggregates, like 
steady-state world output and world consumption, are determined independent of monetary 
factors, which establishes the classical result of long-run monetary neutrality on a world-wide level 
in this model. On a country level, however, we have a long-run non-neutrality of monetary policy, 
which is due to the permanently higher interest income in one of the countries induced by the 
international transfer of wealth. The solution for changes in the steady state price level follows 
directly from the linearized money-demand equation (34), imposing zero inflation and constant 
interest rates across steady states: 
$ $ $P M C= - .         (43) 
 
II. Short-Run Dynamics with Preset Prices 
So far, we have investigated only the long-run equilibrium behavior of the model. In this section 
we want to turn to the short-run disequilibrium dynamics following unanticipated monetary and 
fiscal shocks. Before doing this, let's introduce one further assumption, namely short-run nominal 
price rigidity. For this purpose, assume that the prices of representative domestic and foreign 
goods, i.e. p(1), p(2), p(3), are set one period in advance but adjust only in the second period, 
absent new shocks24. Thus, what this eventually amounts to can be described as monopoly with 
lagged (by one period) price setting behavior. In order to rationalize the underlying source of 
price stickiness, which will not be explicitly modeled here, we could refer to the menu cost 
approach of Mankiw (1985) and Akerlof and Yellen (1985). One important implication of the 
assumption of preset nominal prices is the finding that output becomes demand determined in the 
short-run, since producers in a monopolistic market, who set prices above marginal cost, will – 
for small enough shocks – find it profitable to meet additional surprise demand at these prices25. 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, one could allow for richer price adjustment mechanisms, like staggered price setting, which 
would just lead to a longer persistence of nominal shocks without modifying the central results of our 
analysis. In Woodford (1996), for example, only a fraction of producers adjust their prices every period, while 
the rest keep their actual prices also in the following period. 
25 This is also the reason why monetary shocks have real effects in our setup. 
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In the short-run, therefore, output is determined entirely by the demand equation (32), whereas 
(35), equating marginal cost and marginal revenue, does not bind in the short run. 
 
In this section we will examine the effects of one-time unanticipated monetary and fiscal shocks 
on exchange rates, the current account and other key variables. In order to find simple analytical 
solutions, we shall assume that the system will reach the new long-run steady state just one period 
after the shock has occurred, because that is how long nominal prices take to adjust. Hence, the 
first period can be interpreted as the short-run disequilibrium response and the second period as 
the long-run equilibrium response to some exogenous policy shock. This allows us to simplify the 
notation from now on by dropping time subscripts completely, with barred variables denoting 
long-run (period 2 and beyond) variables and variables without bars denoting short-run (period 
1) variables. 
 
One further difference between the short-run disequilibrium and the long-run equilibrium is that in 
the period when a shock occurs, the current accounts need not be balanced, whereas in the 
steady state (22) must hold for each country. Thus, in the short run a country's per capita current 
account imbalance is given by 
B B r B
p y
P
C Gt t t t
t t
t
t t+ - = + - -1 .      (44) 
Log-linearizing this short-run current account equation for country 1 yields 
( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $B y C n E n E G1 1 1 1 12 1 23 11 2= - - - - - -     (45) 
where we have made use of equation (26) and of the fact that p(1), p(2) and p(3) are preset in 
the short run, implying ( ) ( ) ( )$ $ $p p p1 2 3 0= = = . Furthermore, in deriving equation (45) we 
imposed the assumption that B0 0=  which implies that also B1 0=  and B B2 =
$ . 
II.A. Solving the Short-Run System in Terms of Monetary and Fiscal Shocks 
Now we want to solve the model for short-run variables like exchange rates, consumption 
differentials, the first-period current accounts and the world real interest rate as functions of 
monetary and fiscal policy shifts, in order to investigate the effects of the policy shifts on these 
variables. The policy shocks we will consider are temporary and permanent changes to the 
relative money supply (e.g. $ $M M1 2-  for temporary and $ $M M1 2-  for permanent shocks) as 
well as temporary and permanent changes to relative government spending (e.g. $ $G G1 2-  and 
$ $G G1 2-  as before). 
II.A.1. Graphical Interpretation of the Exchange Rate 
An interesting feature of the model is that the effects of macroeconomic policy shifts on the 
exchange rate can be analyzed also graphically. For this purpose, we need to derive two 
equations giving the exchange rate as a function of consumption differentials and the monetary and 
fiscal policy shocks. To derive the first equation, which we label MM schedule, we need to 
 14
combine the money demand equation (34) with the consumption Euler equation (33)26. As a first 
step, subtracting the consumption Euler equation (27) of, say, country 2 from the corresponding 
equation of country 1 yields: 
$ $ $ $C C C C1 2 1 2- = - .        (46) 
Equation (46) shows that all shocks have permanent effects on the consumption differential 
between the two countries, which stems from the fact that residents in both countries face the 
same real interest rate. Analogously, subtract the money demand equation of country 2 from the 
corresponding equation of country 127, lead it by one period, combine the resulting expression 
with (46) and substitute it for $E12  into the original equation (of footnote 27) to obtain the MM 
schedule: 
( ) ( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $ $E C C r r M M r M M12 1 2 1 1 2
1
1 2= - - +
+
- + -é
ëê
ù
ûú
.   (47) 
The MM schedule in Figure 1 has slope -1 and is downward sloping because an increase in 
relative consumption in country 1 also raises relative money demand in this country, requiring the 
price level to fall to restore equilibrium in the money market, thus inducing an appreciation of the 
currency of country 1 vis-à-vis the currency of country 2. 
 
A second relation between the exchange rate on the one hand, and the consumption differential 
and monetary and fiscal policy shocks on the other hand, labeled GG schedule, is obtained by 
combining essentially two expressions giving the above variables as functions of net-foreign asset 
positions. Subtract the short-run current account equation (45) of country 2 from the 
corresponding equation of country 1, eliminate the output differential by making use of country 1 
and country 2 versions of the demand equation (32) – with p(1) and p(2) preset – and eliminate 
the short-run current account differential with the help of equation (38), additionally, making use 
of (46) to eventually find the GG schedule: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $ $E
r
r
C C G G
r
G G12
2 1
1
1 2
1
1
1 2
1
1 22=
+ +
-
- +
-
- + -é
ëê
ù
ûú
q q
q q
. 
 (48) 
The GG schedule has a positive slope because in the short run relative consumption of country 1 
must rise, if relative output of country 1 rises, which again is only possible if relative demand for 
output of country 1 is increased as a consequence of a depreciation of the exchange rate of 
country 1 vis-à-vis country 2. 
 
                                                 
26 We follow the labeling introduced by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), who obviously intended to build a bridge 
to the textbook Mundell-Fleming model, where, analogous to our MM schedule, the LM schedule also 
represents equilibrium in the money market. 
27 This yields ( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $ $M M E C C
r
E E1 2 12 1 2
1
12 12- - = - - -æèç
ö
ø÷ , which is virtually identical to the central 
equation of the flexible-price Cagan-type monetary model, except that here consumption differentials appear in 
place of output differentials in the monetary model. 
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We can observe from equations (47) and (48) that it is the discounted sum of present and future 
monetary and fiscal shocks rather than their temporary or permanent values alone, that determine 
the post-shock path of the exchange rate. For the purpose of our graphical analysis, however, 
assume that all shocks are permanent, thus implying that $ $ $ $M M M M1 2 1 2- = -  and 
$ $ $ $G G G G1 2 1 2- = - . From (47) it then follows that $ $E E12 12= , i.e. the exchange rate jumps 
immediately to its new long-run level following a permanent relative money supply shock28. Let us 
now consider monetary and fiscal shocks separately in order to isolate the effects of the two 
types of shocks. In Figure 1, which displays the effects of a relative rise in the money supply of 
country 1 vis-à-vis country 2, the initial pre-shock MM schedule shifts upward when the shock 
occurs, with the intersection of M'M' and GG representing the new short- and also long-run 
equilibrium. We can observe that the exchange rate of country 1 depreciates, but by an amount 
proportionally smaller than the relative money supply increase (see also equation (49)). The 
reason for this is that – as Figure 1 suggests – also relative consumption of country 1 must rise, 
which again is due to the temporary rise in relative income of country 1 caused by the 
depreciation. 
 
 
M
M
G
G
slope -1
( )
( )
2 1
12
q q
q
+ +
-
r
rslope
M’
M’
( )$ $M M1 2-
$E12
$ $C C1 2-
 
 
Figure 1: A permanent (positive) relative money supply shock 
 
 
                                                 
28 There is no exchange-rate overshooting à la Dornbusch in this model. In Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, 
Chapter 10) a variant of this model, including non-traded goods, is considered where overshooting can occur. 
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In Figure 2 we examine the short-run effects of a permanent shock to relative government 
spending. As the dynamics in this Figure suggest, a relative rise in government spending of country 
1 leads to a decrease in the relative consumption of country 1 and at the same time to a decrease 
in money demand in this country. Lower money demand – together with constant money supply, 
i.e. $ $M M1 2 0- =  – requires the price level of country 1 to increase to restore equilibrium in the 
money market, thus inducing the exchange rate of country 1 vis-à-vis country 2 to depreciate. The 
reason why the consumption differential declines here in the short as well as in the long run has 
already been discussed in I.E. 
 
 
M
M
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G
$ $C C1 2-
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1
1
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+
-
-
r
r
G G
q
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Figure 2: A permanent (positive) relative government spending shock 
 
II.A.2. Analytical Solution of the Model for Exchange Rates, Consumption Differentials, 
Current Accounts, Terms of Trade, and the World Real Interest Rate 
To solve for the short-run change in the exchange rate of country 1 vis-à-vis country 2 as a 
function of the monetary and fiscal policy shocks we have to combine equations (47) and (48). In 
addition, let’s assume from now on that money supply shocks are permanent, i.e. 
$ $ $ $M M M M1 2 1 2- = - , while allowing for temporary and permanent government spending 
shocks. Analogous manipulations lead to the corresponding expressions for the exchange rate 
between country 1 and country 3 and between country 2 and country 3: 
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( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $ $E
r
r
M M
r
r
G G
r
G G12
1 2
1 2
1 2
1
1 2
1 2
1
1 2=
+ +
+ +
- +
+
+ +
- + -é
ëê
ù
ûú
q q
q q q
q
q q q
,(49) 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $ $E
r
r
M M
r
r
G G
r
G G13
1 2
1 2
1 3
1
1 2
1 3
1
1 3=
+ +
+ +
- +
+
+ +
- + -é
ëê
ù
ûú
q q
q q q
q
q q q
,(50) 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $ $E
r
r
M M
r
r
G G
r
G G23
1 2
1 2
2 3
1
1 2
2 3
1
2 3=
+ +
+ +
- +
+
+ +
- + -é
ëê
ù
ûú
q q
q q q
q
q q q
.(51) 
The finding, that the exchange rate between country A and B is determined exclusively by 
monetary and fiscal parameters of these two countries, is due to the fact that we are considering 
only equilibria that are completely symmetric across all countries. Asymmetric equilibria would 
yield expressions with much more complex policy combinations as determinants of the exchange 
rate between any two countries. Next, we combine equations (47) and (49) to solve for the 
difference between (short- and long-run) changes in per capita consumption in country 1 and 
country 2: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $C C
r
r
M M
r
r
G G
r
G G1 2
1
1 2
1 2
1
1 2
1 2
1
1 2
2
- =
-
+ +
- -
+
+ +
- + -é
ëê
ù
ûú
q
q q q
q
q q q
.(52) 
To find the short-run current account of, say, country 1 – which here equals the long-run change 
in net-foreign assets of country 1 – we proceed as follows: Subtract a country 2 version of (45) 
from (45), make use of country 1 and country 2 versions of the demand equation (32), imposing 
preset prices, and substitute equations (49) and (52) into the resulting expression to obtain an 
expression for the current account differential between country 1 and 2, $ $B B1 2- . Next, find the 
corresponding expression for $ $B B1 3- , remember that $B W = 0 , and plug these expressions into 
the identity we already used in deriving equation (42) and, finally, assume – for simplicity – that 
the government spending shock is permanent to obtain 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]$ $ $ $ $ $ $B r n M G n n M G n M G1
1
1 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 31 2 1 2=
-
+ +
- + - - + - - +
q
q
.(53) 
We can observe from (53) that monetary and fiscal expansions in country 1 tend to drive the 
short-run current account of country 1 into surplus, while fiscal and monetary expansions in 
country 2 and 3 tend to drive it into deficit. For the simple case of a permanent monetary or fiscal 
expansion in country 1 vis-à-vis country 2 – which we considered in the graphical analysis of the 
previous subsection – the interpretation goes that the depreciation of the currency of country 1 
temporarily raises relative income of country 1 so that it runs a current account surplus with 
country 2, due to consumption smoothing behavior of country 1 residents29. Furthermore, 
equation (53) indicates that the size of the current account imbalance is dependent on the relative 
size of the countries, with larger countries' current accounts being affected less by monetary and 
fiscal shocks than the current accounts of smaller countries. 
 
                                                 
29 A temporary expansion, on the other hand, leads to a current account deficit in the expanding country. For 
a thorough discussion of this point see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
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By substituting the expression for $ $B B1 2- , which we already derived above, into (39) we can 
express the change in the long-run terms of trade of country 1 vis-à-vis country 2 as a function of 
the monetary and fiscal policy disturbances: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $p E p
r
r
M M
r
r
G G
r
G G1 12 2
1
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1
1 2- - =
-
+ +
- -
+ +
- + -æèç
ö
ø÷
é
ëê
ù
ûú
q
qq q q q q
.(54) 
A (positive) relative monetary shock emanating from country 1 generates an improvement in its 
long-run terms of trade vis-à-vis country 2, whereas a (positive) relative government spending 
shock in country 1 generates a fall in its terms of trade. By comparing (54) with equation (49), 
which gives (the negative value of) the short-run change in the terms of trade of country 1, since 
p(1) and p(2) are preset in the short run, we can see that the long-run change is an order of 
magnitude smaller than the short-run change and that the short-run and the long-run terms of trade 
effects go in opposite directions. 
 
To see how monetary and fiscal expansions affect the short-run world real interest rate, aggregate 
the consumption Euler equation (33) over all individuals, plug (41) into the resulting expression 
and combine it with an aggregated version of the money demand equation (34), after making use 
of equations (26)–(28) and (36) as well as of country 1,2 and 3 versions of (43) and imposing 
preset prices, to eventually obtain: 
$ $ $r
r
r
M GW W= -
+æ
èç
ö
ø÷ +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
1 1
2
       (55) 
where also ( ) ( )$ $ $ $M n M n n M n MW = + - + -1 2 1 21 2 1 3 . 
A monetary as well as fiscal expansion emanating from either country temporarily lowers world 
real interest rates in proportion to the size of the expanding country. This implies that short-run 
world consumption expands following a monetary expansion and remains constant following a 
fiscal expansion. One further implication of (55) is the finding that only permanent government 
spending shocks affect the short-run real interest rate, while temporary changes in world 
government spending have no liquidity effect. 
 
Finally, we solve for the impact of permanent monetary and fiscal shocks on the short-run change 
in per capita output of country 1 by effecting a manipulation similar to the one that led to (53): 
( )
( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
$
$ $
$ $ $ $
y
r
r n M r n n G
n n M G n M G
1
1
1 2
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
1 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 3
1 1 1
2 1 2
=
+ +
+ + - + + + + - +
+ - - + + - - +
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
úq
q q q q
q q
.(56) 
Interestingly, equation (56) indicates that a unilateral foreign (country 2 or 3) monetary or fiscal 
expansion has a negative net effect on output of country 1 (as q > 1), since with relatively 
increased consumption levels (from 52) the home individuals can afford to substitute out of work 
and into leisure to maintain a constant level of utility. 
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III. Discussion 
To analyze the effects of a monetary union, we compare our three-country world economy with 
respect to monetary and fiscal policy impulses under two different regimes. The first regime 
describes a situation in which three independent countries with independent monetary and fiscal 
authorities coexist. In this case, the three bilateral exchange rates fully display their role as a 
stabilizing force and as channels of transmission of the monetary and fiscal shocks. In the second 
regime two of the three countries form a monetary union with a common monetary authority but 
still independent fiscal authorities30. A monetary union between country 1 and country 2 implies 
that the internal exchange rate becomes irrevocably fixed and that, by definition, the exchange 
rates of country 1 vis-à-vis country 3 and of country 2 vis-à-vis country 3 coincide and represent 
what is then called the external exchange rate. Under this regime, the external exchange rate can 
still adjust in response to monetary and fiscal shocks that emanate from the two remaining 
economic blocs. 
 
We will first discuss the international implications of stylized monetary and fiscal impulses under 
the regime of three completely independent countries. In what follows, we will assume – for 
convenience – that the relative size of the countries Germany, France and the USA are ¼, ¼, ½. 
Obviously, our model is very restrictive in analyzing different types of monetary and fiscal shocks, 
since the long-run equilibrium is assumed to prevail at all times, except for the period when a one-
time unanticipated policy shock hits the economy. Thus, the path of most of the key economic 
variables is disturbed just for a single period. Although we surely know that this is a rather crude 
and unrealistic way of introducing monetary and fiscal disturbances, we can nevertheless justify 
this approach by arguing that our analysis is aimed at merely giving some indication of the 
mechanisms at work and of the direction rather than the exact magnitude of the impact of 
monetary and fiscal shocks. Hence, following the design of our model, we explicitly assume that 
the policy shocks we are going to analyze in this section are unanticipated, permanent and non-
recurring. The stylized monetary and fiscal policy shocks, which will be defined below as policy 
combinations of the three countries conditional on the prevailing regime, will also be defined in an 
"empirically relevant" way, i.e. inspired by real-world observations during the past few years. So, 
if the model is correct, it should provide also "empirically relevant" results. 
III.A. Before the Monetary Union (Three Independent Countries) 
When the three countries are completely independent, one could find various combinations of 
monetary and fiscal policy shocks that generate all kinds of effects on the exchange rates, 
consumption differentials, current accounts, etc. We restrict the possible combinations of policy 
shocks by trying to incorporate the idea of the European integration into our analysis, i.e. the 
economies of France and Germany are more integrated than either of these with the US 
economy. For this reason and due to related factors, like the constraints imposed by the 
                                                 
30 We have chosen this most general formulation of a monetary union. More specifically, one could interpret 
the first regime as a stylized representation of the EMS period where the internal exchange rates of the EU 
countries were allowed to float, within certain pre-specified bands, of course. The second regime, on the other 
hand, can be interpreted as a stylized representation of the EMU once completed and replacing the EMS. 
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Maastricht criteria and the EMS, there is little scope for asymmetric fiscal and monetary policy 
shocks in these two countries. We will account for this in the definition of the stylized monetary 
and fiscal policy shocks below. 
 
The effects of international transmissions of general monetary and fiscal shocks for the case of 
three independent countries have already been discussed in the previous section. The difference is 
that here we consider stylized monetary and fiscal policies, which we assume to be as follows: 
Germany pursues a very tight monetary policy followed by France ("Franc fort") and the USA, so 
that the following differentials are all negative and $ $ $ $ $ $M M M M M M1 2 2 3 1 3- > - > - . On the 
other hand, the fiscal policy is assumed to be tightest in the USA followed by Germany and 
France, so that $ $ $ $ $ $G G G G G G2 3 1 3 1 2- > - > - , with the former two differentials being positive 
and the latter small (Maastricht criteria) and negative31. Note again, that monetary and fiscal 
policies are of this form only once, namely in the period when the shock occurs, while in all other 
periods all exogenous variables are assumed to be constant. The framework of our model 
unfortunately prevents the analysis of other types of shocks, like perturbations to the growth path 
of fiscal and monetary variables. 
 
Given the stylized monetary and fiscal policies as defined above, let us first consider the effects on 
the three exchange rates: Evaluating equations (49), (50) and (51) according to our stylized policy 
shocks one obtains an appreciation of the German currency versus the French currency, an 
appreciation of the German versus the American currency and, in general, an ambiguous net-
effect on the third exchange rate. For reasonable parameter values, however, we get a slight 
depreciation of the French versus the American currency. Furthermore, the appreciation of the 
Dmark vis-à-vis the Franc turns out to be an order of magnitude smaller than the appreciation of 
the Dmark vis-à-vis the Dollar. Likewise, for the (short- and long-run) difference between 
German and French per capita consumption changes the net-effect due to our stylized monetary 
and fiscal shocks is ambiguous, which can easily be seen from (52). Again considering reasonable 
parameter values for q and b , the effect on the consumption differential of Germany and France 
becomes positive and rather small, though, i.e. per capita consumption is increased slightly more 
in Germany than in France. On the other hand, per capita consumption differentials between 
Germany and the USA and between France and the USA are found to be clearly negative, which 
implies that per capita consumption expands most in the USA, followed by comparatively small 
changes in Germany and France. 
 
The effect of our monetary and fiscal policy shocks on the German current account can be found 
by evaluating equation (53): In general, the effect on the German current account is ambiguous, 
but turns out to be negative for reasonable parameter values. Moreover, the USA runs a current 
account surplus as a consequence of our stylized shocks, while the effects on the French current 
account of the monetary shock, which tends to drive it into deficit, and the fiscal shock, which 
tends to drive it into surplus, largely compensate each other, so that the net-effect is ambiguous 
                                                 
31 In contrast to the graphical analysis, we'll now analyze the effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks 
jointly and not separately. 
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and rather small. Last but not least, evaluating (56) gives us the short-run effect of the monetary 
and fiscal shocks on real per capita output in Germany: Hence, German output is expected to 
increase as a result of our stylized policy shocks. By exploring also the respective expressions for 
the other countries' output as well as the expressions for short-run output differentials, we observe 
that also French and American real output should increase, with French output expanding most 
followed by US output and – far behind – German output. 
 
III.B. A Two-Country Monetary Union 
The interesting part, however, is to analyze the implications of a monetary union on the 
international transmission of monetary and fiscal policies. For this purpose, we assume that two of 
the three countries decide to form a monetary union, i.e. to share a common currency. This 
includes assuming that a common monetary authority is responsible for the management of the 
common currency, while there is, in principle, no particular need to completely synchronize fiscal 
policies in the two countries. It is, however, desirable to achieve a certain degree of economic 
convergence within the monetary union, including also government debt levels, for the monetary 
union to be effective. This implies that fiscal policies should not be left at the complete discretion 
of the national governments, but should be restricted to be more or less symmetric in order to 
achieve convergence in debt levels32. In terms of our model, assuming a two-country monetary 
union implies that we fix the internal exchange rate, while the external exchange rate is still free to 
adjust in response to asymmetric fiscal and monetary shocks33. Asymmetric monetary policy is 
now possible only between the monetary union and the third country, since the common monetary 
authority centralizes the monetary policy for the whole monetary union. Asymmetric fiscal policy, 
on the other hand, is of course possible between the monetary union and the third country but 
also within the monetary union, in a very restricted way, though. 
 
In order to be able to analyze the international transmissions of monetary and fiscal policy shocks 
under the new regime, we first have to incorporate the modifications for the case of a monetary 
union into our three-country model. Specifically, we assume that country 1 and country 2 
(Germany and France) form a monetary union by fixing the internal exchange rate, E12. In this 
case it is convenient to normalize the internal exchange rate to 1, which implies that the exchange 
rates of country 1 and 2 vis-à-vis country 3 now coincide and equal the external exchange rate. 
The latter can be verified by combining equations (5), (6) and (7) to obtain the relation E13 = 
E12E23, so that, if E12 = 1, it follows that E13 = E2334. Normalizing the internal exchange rate 
to 1 can also be interpreted as adopting a common currency, which we call "Euro", with the 
                                                 
32 In the case of the EMU the so called "stability pact" has been adopted which is intended to impose a 
restriction on the fiscal deficits of the participating countries in order to keep the debt levels in line and to 
avoid countries running unsustainable deficits. 
33 In denoting the bilateral exchange rate of the countries which form the monetary union "internal exchange 
rate" and the exchange rate of the currency of the monetary union and the third country's currency "external 
exchange rate" we follow van Aarle, Garretsen and van Moorsel (1998). 
34 One further consequence of assuming E12 = 1 is that $E12 0= , which again confirms that a depreciation of 
the internal exchange rate is no longer feasible. 
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external exchange rate representing the new Euro/Dollar rate, simply denoted by E (instead of 
E13 or E23). 
 
What are the consequences of establishing a two-country monetary union in terms of our model? 
From (4) and (5) we can see that purchasing power parity implies that the price levels in the two 
countries become identical: 
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From the fact that in the case of a monetary union $E12 0=  and $ $M M1 2 0- = , since 
asymmetric monetary shocks between country 1 and 2 are no longer possible, it immediately 
follows that the short- as well as long-run per capita consumption and consequently also output 
differentials, $ $C C1 2- , $ $C C1 2- , $ $y y1 2-  and $ $y y1 2- , are all equal to zero. Exploring the 
model further and taking these results into account, we observe that also 
( ) ( )$ $ $ $G G r G G1 2
1
1 2- + -  is equal to zero, which implies that in either case, for temporary and 
permanent government spending shocks, we have $ $G G1 2 0- =  and $ $G G1 2 0- =  and therefore 
also $ $B B1 2 0- = . The important implication of the previous result is the fact that, although the 
two governments could, in principle, pursue divergent fiscal policies, they don't do it, but instead 
fully synchronize their government spending. Why do the governments act this way? If we 
subtract the overall resource constraint of the economy of country 2 – as indicated in footnote 15 
– from the corresponding expression of country 1 and make use of the above results, stating that 
the two countries are completely symmetric in consumption and output levels in all periods, we 
get the relation: 
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Equation (58) states that the present discounted value of all future differential government 
spending levels (in a two-country monetary union) has to equal the difference in their initial net-
foreign asset positions. This implicitly follows from the assumption of Ricardian equivalence in our 
model, which ensures that government budgets have to be balanced in the long run, and, 
therefore, also the differential government spendings in a federal state (or a monetary union) have 
to be zero in the very long run. Log-linearizing (58) and making use of the usual assumption, 
B B0 01 2 0= = , yields 
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This implies that, in principle, the two governments could run divergent fiscal policies in any 
period, given that the differential government spendings are balanced by future differentials of the 
opposite sign, such that the discounted infinite sum of these differentials equals the initial net-
foreign asset differential – which in our case is assumed to be zero. Thus, evaluating (59) under 
the assumption that the system reaches the new steady state following an unanticipated 
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government spending shock after one period and remembering that B0 0=  and B1 0= , we get 
(to confirm the above result) 
( ) ( )0 1 2 1 1 2= - + -$ $ $ $G G r G G .      (60) 
Hence, the key finding of this paper follows that, according to our model, the countries forming a 
monetary union become completely symmetric also with respect to the dynamics following 
monetary and fiscal policy shocks which, both, can no longer be asymmetric. The intuition is that, 
when exogenously fixing the exchange rate and restricting monetary policy to be symmetric, fiscal 
policy in the two countries becomes the endogenous variable which has to adjust in order to keep 
the exchange rate fixed35. In fact, the three-country model collapses to a two-country model as a 
consequence of establishing a monetary union, with the monetary union and the third country now 
representing the remaining two countries in the model. This is, indeed, what politicians expect the 
EMU to amount to, when they proclaim that it represents the completion and crowning of the 
European Internal Market. 
 
Now let us consider the effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks on various economic 
variables for the case of a monetary union. For reasons we have already explored above, 
asymmetric monetary and fiscal policy shocks are only feasible between the monetary union as a 
whole and the third country. Paralleling our analysis of section II, we observe that these 
asymmetric policy shocks affect the world-wide distribution of wealth and consequently lead to 
asymmetric adjustment dynamics of the key economic variables in the remaining two economic 
blocs. In particular, we want to explore the effects of asymmetric monetary and fiscal shocks on 
the short-run dynamics of the exchange rate, the current account and the long-run terms of trade. 
Modifying equations (50) – or (51) -, (53) and a country 1-3 or 2-3 version of (54) for the case 
of a monetary union, yields 
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where $E  denotes the change in the Euro/Dollar exchange rate and $ME , $GE , $BE  and ( )$p E  
denote the changes in the monetary union's (E for European) money supply, government 
spending, net-foreign assets and representative good's price. 
 
We can repeat now the interesting experiment of investigating the effects of stylized monetary and 
fiscal policy shocks, as we did in the previous subsection. Of course, the stylized monetary and 
fiscal policies have to be redefined for the case of a monetary union: We assume that the 
authorities in the monetary union pursue monetary and fiscal policies that are somehow an average 
                                                 
35 This is similar to the result obtained in the Mundell-Fleming model under fixed exchange rates, where 
monetary policy becomes ineffective since it is constrained to adjust in order to maintain monetary 
equilibrium. 
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mix of the former German and French policies, that is to say, that the monetary union runs a 
tighter monetary policy but easier fiscal policy than the USA. This is equivalent to assuming that 
the differential of monetary policies, $ $ME M- 3 , is negative and that the differential of fiscal 
policies, $ $GE G- 3 , is positive, with the two differentials being of approximately equal size. 
 
An interesting question that is frequently asked in the current discussion about EMU is, if the Euro 
is more likely to appreciate or depreciate vis-à-vis the Dollar, assuming that current policy stances 
are perpetuated into the future. Given our stylized monetary and fiscal policies – which we do not 
consider too far from reality -, we find that, by evaluating (61), the Euro should appreciate slightly 
vis-à-vis the Dollar in response to the stylized policy shocks. The net-effect of the two 
counteracting policies on $E  is negative, because, according to (61), the impact of monetary 
policy on the exchange rate is stronger than the impact of fiscal policy. Evaluating also (62) with 
respect to our stylized policy shocks indicates that the appreciation of the Euro leads to a current 
account deficit in the monetary union in the short run – which equals the long-run change in the 
union's net-foreign asset position. Finally, by evaluating (63) we realize that the effect of our 
stylized monetary and fiscal policy shocks on the long-run terms of trade of the monetary union is 
unambiguously negative, i.e. the European terms of trade deteriorate substantially in the long run in 
response to the policy shocks. The intuition behind this becomes apparent from a modified 
version of (52), which indicates that lower European consumption implies lower money demand 
which requires the European price level to fall in order to restore equilibrium in the money market. 
IV. Conclusions 
We have just explored the implications of the implementation of a (two-country) monetary union 
on the international transmission of monetary and fiscal policy shocks in the previous section. We 
have to be aware, though, that this analysis is quite restrictive in, at least, two different senses. 
First and most importantly, our key result that the countries forming a monetary union become 
completely symmetric with respect to all per capita variables – including government spending 
levels – hinges mainly on the fact that we are considering only a one-time fiscal shock in our 
analysis. Ever-recurring differential government spending shocks would, however, lead to 
frequent imbalances of the current account, since the differential government spendings have to be 
balanced only in the very long run. Our key result can, therefore, be interpreted as indicating that 
the countries forming a monetary union, in essence, face a situation that is equivalent to the 
situation of independent regional governments within a federal state, that are allowed to run 
different fiscal policies. 
 
Second, the effects of our stylized policy shocks on the exchange rate, the current account and 
the terms of trade as described above, are sensitive to the assumptions about the specific form 
and combination of the policy shocks. It is clear that, assuming policy shocks of a different kind 
can yield completely different, sometimes even opposing, reactions of these variables to the 
shocks. 
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It is one further limitation of this rather stylized monetary model that it does not consider capital 
and investment decisions and that it ignores non-traded goods in the analysis of price levels and 
exchange rates. While the former can be justified by arguing that our model is not intended to be a 
growth model, there is, however, no particular reason to omit the latter. Allowing for non-traded 
goods does indeed represent a potentially interesting extension of our analysis, since in this case 
price levels need not become identical as a consequence of the monetary union, which leads to 
quite different short-run dynamics in the model. Moreover, considering only one-period nominal 
rigidities, as a convenient simplification, clearly represents a restriction to the analysis of 
macroeconomic adjustment. Allowing for richer price dynamics – as in Woodford (1996) – 
would lead to a longer persistence of monetary and fiscal policy shocks. One further direction in 
which our analysis can be extended by future work is to compute numerical simulations along with 
impulse-response functions of macroeconomic policy shocks for the case of staggered price 
adjustment. 
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